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The relational interpretation (or RQM, for Relational Quantum Mechanics)
solves the measurement problem by considering an ontology of sparse relative
facts. Facts are realized in interactions between any two physical systems and
are relative to these systems. RQM’s technical core is the realisation that quan-
tum transition amplitudes determine physical probabilities only when their ar-
guments are facts relative to the same system. The relativity of facts can be
neglected in the approximation where decoherence hides interference, thus mak-
ing facts approximately stable.
Historical roots
In his celebrated 1926 paper [1], Erwin Schrödinger introduced the wave func-
tion ψ and computed the hydrogen’s spectrum from first principles. This spec-
trum, however, had already been computed from first principles by Pauli four
month earlier [2], using the theory emerged from Werner Heisenberg’s 1925
breakthrough [3], based on the equation
qp− pq = i~, (1)
with no reference to ψ. The theory we call “quantum mechanics”, in fact, had
already evolved into its current full set of equations in the series of articles by
Born, Jordan and Heisenberg himself [4, 5]. Dirac, equally inspired by Heisen-
berg’s breakthrough, got to the same structure independently in 1925, the year
before Schrödinger’s work, in a work titled “The fundamental equations of quan-
tum mechanics” [6]. (See [7, 8] for a detailed historical account.) Properly, the
only Nobel Prize with the motivation “for the creation of quantum mechanics”
was assigned to Heisenberg.
So, what did Schrödinger achieve in 1926? With hindsight, he took a tech-
nical and a conceptual step. The technical step was to translate the unfamiliar
algebraic language of quantum theory into a familiar one: differential equations.
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This brought the novel ethereal quantum theory down to the level of the aver-
age theoretical physicist. The conceptual step was to introduce the notion of
“wave function”, soon evolved into the general notion of “quantum state”, ψ,
endowing it with ontological weight.
The Relational Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics, or RQM, is based on
the idea that this conceptual step, which doesn’t add anything to the predictive
power of the theory, was misleading: we are paying the price for the confusion
it generated.
The mistaken idea is that the quantum state ψ represents the “actual stuff”
described by quantum mechanics. This idea has pervaded later thinking about
the theory, fostered by the toxic habit of introducing students to quantum theory
in the form of Schrödinger’s “wave mechanics”, thus betraying history, logic, and
reasonableness.
The true founders of quantum mechanics saw immediately the mistakes in
this conceptual step. Heisenberg was vocal in pointing them out [9]: First,
Schrödinger’s ground for considering ψ to be “real” was the claim that quan-
tum theory is a theory of waves in physical space. This of course is wrong: the
state of two particles cannot be expressed as two functions on physical space.
Second, a pure-wave formulation misses the essential feature of quantum the-
ory: discreteness, which must be recovered by additional assumptions as there
is no reason for a physical wave to have energy related to frequency. Nobody ex-
pressed this point clearer than Schrödinger’s himself who much later recognised:
“There was a moment when the creators of wave mechanics [that is, himself] nur-
tured the illusion of having eliminated the discontinuities in quantum theory.
But the discontinuities eliminated from the equations of the theory reappear
the moment the theory is confronted with what we observed.”[10]. Third, most
importantly, if we take ψ to be real we fall into the infamous “measurement
problem”. In its most vivid form (due to Einstein): a wave spreads over a re-
gion of space, how comes it suddenly concentrates into the single spot where the
particle manifests itself? Schrödinger understood the difficulty with his early
interpretation, changed his mind repeatedly about the interpretation of the the-
ory [11], and became one of the most insightful contributors to the debate on
the interpretation; but the badly misleading idea of taking the “quantum state”
as a faithful picture of reality stuck.
Heisenberg lost the political battle against wave mechanics for a number of
reasons: Differential equations are easier to work with than non-commutative
algebras. “Interpretation” wasn’t so interesting for many physicists, when the
equations of quantum mechanics begun producing wonders. Dirac found it
easier to give the algebra a linear representation, and von Neumann followed:
his robust math brilliantly focused on the algebras, but gave weight to their
representation on Hilbert spaces of “states”. And finally Niels Bohr —fatherly
figure of the community— tried to mediate between his two extraordinarily
brilliant bickering children, Heisenberg and Schrödinger, by obscurely agitating
hands about a shamanic “wave/particle duality”.
A way to get clarity about quantum mechanics is to undo the conceptual
mess raised by Schrödinger’s introduction of the “quantum state”. This is what
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the Relational Interpretation does.
Quantum theory is about physical facts, not quantum states
RQM was proposed in the late Nineties [12], and has acquired increased clarity
over time [13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18]. Interest in RQM has grown slowly by steadily,
attracting attention during the last decade particulary from philosophers [19,
20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27].
RQM interprets quantum mechanics as a theory about physical facts. The
theory provides transition amplitudes of the form W (b, a) that determine the
probability P (b, a) = |W (b, a)|2 for a fact (or a collection of facts) b to oc-
cur, given that a fact (or a collection of facts) a has occurred. Facts are the
independent variables of the quantum transition amplitudes.
A fact is for instance a particle having a certain value of a spin component
at a certain time, or being at a certain place at a certain time. We perceive and
describe the world in terms of such facts. An example of transition probability
is the probability P (Lφ = ~/2, Lz = ~/2) = cos2(φ/2) of having spin ~/2 in a
direction at angle φ from the z axis (a fact) if the spin in the direction z was
~/2 (a fact). A fact is quantitatively described by the value of a variable or a
set of variables.
Classical mechanics can equally be interpreted as a theory about physical
facts, described by values of physical variables (points in phase space). But
there are three differences between quantum facts and the corresponding facts
of classical mechanics. First, their dynamical evolution laws are genuinely prob-
abilistic. Second, the spectrum of possible facts is limited by quantum discrete-
ness (for instance: energy or spin can have only certain values). Third, crucially,
facts are sparse and relative.
Facts are sparse: they are realised only at the interactions between (any)
two physical systems. This is the key physical insight in Heisenberg’s seminal
paper and a basic assumption of RQM.
Facts are relative to the systems that interact. That is, they are labelled by
the interacting systems. This is the core idea of RQM. It gives a general and
precise formulation to the central feature of quantum theory, on which Bohr has
correctly long insisted: contextuality.
The insight of RQM is that the transition amplitudes W (b, a) must be inter-
preted as determining physical probability amplitudes only if the physical facts
a and b are relative to the same systems.
If all facts are relative to (or labeled by) the systems involved in the inter-
actions, how come that we can describe a macroscopic world disregarding the
labels? The reason decoherence [28, 29, 30]: because of decoherence, a subset
of all relative facts become stable [18]. This means that if we disregard their la-
belling we only miss interference effects that are anyway practically unaccessible
because of our limited access to the large number of degrees of freedom of the
world. The conventional laboratory “measurement outcomes” are a particular
case of stable facts [18]; they are relative fact (realised in the pre-measurements)
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that can be considered stable because of the decoherence due to the interaction
of the pointer variable with the environment.
The relational resolution of the measurement problem
The problem. The measurement problem can be understood as the apparent
contradiction between two postulates of the textbook formulation of quantum
theory. On the one hand, the unitary evolution postulate states that the am-
plitude W (b(t), a) for a fact b to happen at time t changes in t according to the
linear Schrödinger evolution equation i~ ∂tW (b(t), a) = HW (b, a), where H is a
unitary linear operator. On the other hand, the projection postulate states that
probabilities change when a fact occurs. The contradiction appears because of
quantum interference: interference effects in the unitary evolution are cancelled
by the projection.
Explicitly, suppose we know that a fact a has happened and one of N mu-
tually exclusive facts bi (i = 1 . . . N) can later happen. By composition of





P (c|bi)P (bi|a), (2)
where P (b|a) is the probability for b to happen, given a. From the relation




|W (c, bi)|2|W (bi, a)|2. (3)
But since quantum probabilities are squares of amplitudes and amplitudes sum,
linear evolution requires
Punitary(c|a) = |W (c, a)|2 =
∣∣∣∑
i





|W (c, bi)|2|W (bi, a)|2 = Pcollapse(c|a).
So, what is the probability for c to happen? The projection postulate de-
mands it to be Pcollapse(c|a) but the unitary evolution postulate requires it to
be Punitary(c|a), and the two are different because of interference.
The textbook answer is that the first holds “if a measurement has happened”,
while the second holds if it hasn’t. But what counts as a measurement? Does
Wigner’s friend’s [31] observation count as a measurement? Does Schrödinger’s
cat’s [32] observation of the releasing of the poison count as a measurement?
A positive answer to these two questions violates the universality of the evo-
lution postulate. But a negative answer (as in the Many World interpretation)
fogs the relation between the theory and the facts in terms of which we account
for the world.
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The RQM solution. The solution offered by RQM is that facts are labelled
by systems. They are labelled by the systems involved in the interaction where
the fact happens. In general, equation (3) does not hold if the bi have different
labels than c, because the amplitudes W (b, a) determine probabilities only if a
and b are relative to the same system. This solves the apparent contradiction.
For instance, in the Wigner’s friend scenario, the friend interacts with a
system and a fact is realised with respect to the friend. But this fact is not
realised with respect to Wigner, who was not involved in the interaction, and
the probability for facts with respect to Wigner (realised in interactions with
Wigner) still includes interference effects. A fact with respect to the friend does
not count as a fact with respect to Wigner. With respect to Wigner, it only
determines the establishment of an “entanglement”, namely the expectation of
a correlation, between the friend and the system.
In the case of Schrödinger’s cat, the release or not of the poison is a fact with
respect to the cat. An external observer with superior measuring capacities can
still detect interference effects (which would not have been possible if the release
–or not– of the poison had become a fact in an interaction with her.)
Notice that in an ontology based on facts rather than quantum states, the
phrase “Schrödinger’s cat is in a quantum superposition” means only that we
cannot use neither the cat being dead nor the cat being alive as inputs for
transition amplitudes. This is precisely what RQM clarifies: facts are labelled
by the systems involved in the interactions and the transition amplitudesW (b, a)
have physical meaning only if a and b are relative to a same system.
Measurement outcomes and relation with Copenhagen in-
terpretation
If sufficient decoherence intervenes, the difference between Pcollapse(c|a) and
Punitary(c|a) becomes negligible. In this situation we can safely consider the
bi facts as realised, independently from their labelling. When we can disregard
the labels of a fact, we call it “stable”. [18] This is the case for the textbook
laboratory quantum measurement outcomes [18], which assume a macroscopic
apparatus, and hence decoherence. The macroscopic world is entirely described
by stable facts.
Could we base the ontology on the sole stable facts? This is what is done
in the Copenhagen interpretation and in QBism [33]. The difficulty with this
choice is that decoherence is generally approximate only, and only relative to
the lack of access to environment degrees of freedom. Therefore the stability
of the stable facts is always only approximate. It requires the observer system
to have properties that real systems have only approximately. RQM, on the
other hand, is based on the observation that enlarging the ontology from stable
facts to all relative facts resolves this difficulty, and therefore the difficulty of
characterising what is an observer and what is a measurement.
For relative facts, every interaction can be seen as a “Copenhagen measure-
ment”, but only for the systems involved. Any physical system can play the
role of the “Copenhagen observer”, but only for the facts defined with respect
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to itself. From this perspective, RQM is nothing else than a minimal exten-
sion of the textbook Copenhagen interpretation, based on the realisation that
any physical system can play the role of the “observer” and any interaction
can play the role of a “measurement”: this is not in contradiction with the
permanence of interference through interactions because the “measured” values
are only relative to the interacting systems themselves and do not affect third
physical systems.
In the absence of interactions, there are no facts and variables can be gen-
uinely non determinate, as in the Copenhagen’s interpretation [24, 34, 26].
Meaning of the quantum state
What is then a “quantum state”? In RQM, it is a bookkeeping of known facts,
and a tool for predicting the probability of unknown facts, on the basis of the
available knowledge. Since it summarises knowledge about relative facts, the
quantum state ψ of a system (and a fortiori its density matrix ρ) does not
pertain solely to the system. It pertains also to the other system involved
in the interactions that gave rise to the facts considered known. Hence it is
always a relative state. The idea that quantum states are relative states, namely
states of a physical system relative to a second physical system, is Everett’s
lasting contribution to the understanding of quantum theory [35]. Since ψ is
just a theoretical device we use for bookkeeping information and computing
probabilities, it is not a surprise that it jumps if we learn that a fact happens.
The relational interpretation circumvents the PBR (Pusey, Barrett, Rudolph)
theorem because it is not a hidden variable theory [27].
A moment of reflection shows that the quantum states used in real labora-
tories where scientists use quantum mechanics concretely is always a relative
state. The ψ that physicists use in their laboratories to describe a quantum
system is not the hypothetical universal wave function: it is the relative state,
in the sense of Everett, that describes the properties of the system, relative to
the apparata it is interacting with.
In a suitable semiclassical approximation we can write ψ ∼ eiS where S is
a Hamilton-Jacobi function. This shows that the physical nature of ψ is the
same as the physical nature of a Hamilton-Jacobi function. Obviously giving S
ontological weight in classical mechanics is a mistake: S is not a picture of the
“actual stuff” out there: it is a calculation device used to predict an outcome
on the basis of an input.
Quantum mechanics does not need to be interpreted as the theory of the dy-
namics of a mysterious ψ entity, from which the world of our experience emerges
through some involved and obscure argument. It can simply be interpreted as
a theory for computing the probability of facts to occur given that other facts
have occurred.
There is a simple observation that confirms that it is a mistake to charge the
quantum state with ontological weight [15]. Consider particles with spin that
undergo sequences of laboratory measurements of their spin components along
different axes. Say that at time t the spin in the z direction of a particle is
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positive. We can predict that (if nothing else happens in between) the spin has
probability cos2(φ/2) to be up in a direction at angle φ with the z direction.
This is true irrespectively of which comes earlier between t and t′ [15]: quantum
probabilistic predictions are the same forth and back in time [36]. Now: what
is the state of the particle during the time interval between t and t′? Answer:
it depends on what we consider to be known: if I know the past (respectively,
future) value, I can use the state to predict the future (respectively, past) value.
This shows manifestly that the state is a coding of our information; not some-
thing the particle “has”. It is reasonable to be realist about the values of the
spin, which we observe, but not about the ψ in between, because ψ depends on
a time orientation, while the observable physics does not.
Discreteness
Several interpretations of quantum theory neglect discreteness. Discreteness is
not an accessory consequence of quantum theory, it is at its core. Quantum the-
ory is characterised by the Planck constant h = 2π~. This constant sets the scale
of the discreteness of the world and determines how bad is the approximation
provided by classical mechanics’s continuity.
A fact is quantitively described by the values of an ensemble of variables,
that got determined, or “measured”, in the interaction. The space of the values
of these variables is the phase space of the system. For each degree of freedom,
the phase space is two dimensional. A measurement has finite precision: it
determines a region R of phase space. Classical mechanics assumes that R can
be taken to be arbitrarily small.
The volume V (R) of a phase space region R has dimensions Length2 ×
Mass/T ime per degree of freedom, namely action. The Planck constant, which
has dimensions of an action, fixes is the size of the smallest region that a mea-
surement can determine:
V (R) ≥ 2π~ (5)
per degree of freedom. This is a most general and important physical fact at
the core of quantum theory.
It follows that the number of possible values that a variable distinguishing
points within a finite region R of phase space is at most
N ≤ V (R)
2π~
(6)
Hence such a variable can take discrete values only. Any variable separating
finite regions of phase space is discrete.
Quantum mechanics gives the values that a physical quantity can take. Vari-
ables are represented by self-adjoint elements A of the non-commutative (C∗)
algebra defined by qp − pq = i~. The values a that a variable A(q, p) can take




The 1996 seminal RQM paper [12] indicated information as a key concept to
understand quantum theory (under the influence of John Wheeler [37, 38]) and
suggested the program of understanding quantum theory by deriving its peculiar
formalism from a transparent set of elementary “postulates” formulated in terms
of information theory. The hope was that these would clarify the meaning of
the formalism in the manner Einstein’s two Special Relativity postulates had
clarifyed the physical content of the Lorentz transformations.
The two postulates proposed in [12] are:
P1 There is a finite maximal amount of relevant information that can be
obtained from a physical system.
P2 It is always possible to obtain new relevant information from a system by
interacting with it.
Here a compact classical phase space is assumed. (Any classical system can be
approximated by a system with a compact phase space.) “Relevant” information
means information that contributes to the possibility of predicting the outcome
of future interactions. The two postulates are not in contradiction with one
another because when new information is acquired part of the old information
becomes irrelevant. For instance, measuring the spin of a spin 1/2 particle along
a given direction makes the result of any previous spin measurement irrelevant
for the probability distribution of future spin measurements. Related ideas were
independently considered by Zeilinger and Brukner [39, 40].
The first postulate captures the characteristic quantum discreteness. It cor-
responds to (5). “Information” means here nothing else than “number of possi-
ble distinct alternatives”.
The second postulate captures the probabilistic aspects of the theory, be-
cause in a deterministic theory there is no way of adding new information once
the full information about a system is achieved.
Historically, the paper [12] preceded the development of epistemic interpre-
tations like QBism and the birth of the interpretations for the theory based
on quantum information [41, 42, 43]. It also promoted the program of re-
construction of the formalism of quantum mechanics from physically trans-
parent postulates based on information theory (as a “theory of principles”)
[44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51], which has then grown in a number of different
directions. See also [52, 53] where similar ideas have appeared. A particu-
larly successful realisation of the reconstruction program is in the work of Höhn
[54, 55], which uses postulates directly based on P1 and P2 above.
“Information” is understood in this context in its purely physical sense,
namely as correlation: a system has information about another system if the
number of possible states of the two systems is less that the product of the
number of possible states of each. For instance a measuring apparatus that has
information about a system after the measure because its pointer variable is
correlated to the variable of the system.
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The term ‘information’ is ambiguous, with a wide spectrum of meanings
ranging from epistemic states of conscious observers all the way to simply count-
ing alternatives, à la Shannon. As pointed out by Dorato [56], even in its weakest
sense information cannot be taken as a primary notion from which all others
can be derived, since it is always information about something. Nevertheless,
information can be a powerful organisational principle in the sense of Einstein’s
distinction between ‘principle theories’ (like thermodynamics) versus ‘construc-
tive theories’ (like electromagnetism) [43]. The role of the general theory of
mechanics is not to list the ingredients of the world —this is done by the indi-
vidual mechanical theories, like the Standard Model of particle physics, general
relativity, of the harmonic oscillator. The role of the general theory of me-
chanics (like classical mechanics or quantum mechanics) is to provide a general
framework within which specific constructive theories are realized. From this
perspective, the notion of information as number of possible alternatives may
play a useful role in accounting for the general structure of the correlations in
the physical world.
It is in this sense that the two postulates can be understood. They are
limitations on the structure of the values that variables can take. The list of
relevant variables, which define a physical system, and their algebraic relations,
are provided by specific quantum theories.
The relation between formalism and interpretation
The non-commutativity of the physical variables is Heisenberg technical break-
through, understood and formalised by Born and Jordan, and independently by
Dirac. Both arrived independently at the main equation (1) (and its generali-
sations).
Heisenberg’s breakthrough is the idea of keeping the same equations as in
the classical theory, but replacing commuting variables with non commuting
ones, satisfying (as soon later realized by Born and Jordan) equation (1). In a
sense, one could say that quantum theory has the same equations as the classical
theory, plus this single equation. The formalism of quantum theory is condensed
in this single equation. The entire quantum phenomenology follows from this
equation.
As well known, the Heisenberg uncertainty relations
∆q ∆p ≤ ~/2 (7)
can be derived from (1) in a few lines. Hence (1) leads immediately to (6), hence
to discreteness, establishing the quantitative aspect of discreteness (by ~). This
is directly related to the first postulate.
On the other hand, the non-commutativity expressed in (1) reflects the fact
that the result of the measurements of q and p depends on the order in which
measurements are made: this is what blocks the possibility of a complete spec-
ification of all the variables of a system: it is is directly related to the second
postulate. Both postulates are made concrete in the math by equation (1).
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In other words, the non-commutativity of the algebra of the variables (mea-
sured by ~) is the mathematical expression of the physical fact that variables
cannot be simultaneously sharp, hence there is a (~-size) minimal volume at-
tainable in phase space, and predictions are probabilistic.
The fact that values of variables can be predicted only probabilistically raises
immediately the key interpretational question of quantum mechanics: when
and how is a probabilistic disposition resolved into an actual value? RQM has
a simple answer: when any two systems interact, provided that we label the
resulting facts with the interacting systems themselves.
Other considerations
No-go theorems for non-relative facts. There are a number of no-go theorems
for non-relative (absolute) facts [57, 58, 58], and some experimental con-
firmations of them [59, 60]. The existence of facts non labelled by systems
is among the inputs of these theorems, hence these no-go theorems can
be taken as direct evidence in favour of RQM. See a detailed discussion in
[18] and also [61, 62].
Locality. The way in which quantum non locality is realised in RQM [14, 63] has
been clarified recently in [64, 65], showing how the tension with relativity
is alleviated by the fact that a measurement in a location cannot be an
element of reality with respect to a distantly located observer.
Quantum Gravity. RQM is fit for quantum gravity [66, 67] (in fact, this was its
historical motivation). In quantum gravity, we do not have a background
spacetime where to locate things. RQM works because the quantum rela-
tionalism combines in a surprisingly natural manner with the relationalism
of general relativity. Locality is what makes this work [68]: the quantum
mechanical notion of “physical system” an be identified with the general
relativistic notion of “spacetime region”. The quantum mechanical notion
of “interaction” between systems is identified with the general relativistic
notion of “adjacency” between spacetime regions. Locality assures that
interaction requires (and defines) adjacency. Thus quantum “states” can
be associated to three dimensional surfaces bounding spacetime regions
and quantum mechanical transition amplitudes are associated to “pro-
cesses” identified with the spacetime regions themselves. In other words,
variables actualise at three dimensional boundaries, with respect to (arbi-
trary) spacetime partitions. The theory can then be used locally, without
necessarily assuming anything about the global aspects of the universe.
Philosophical implications
The beauty of the problem of the interpretation of quantum mechanics is the
fact that the spectacular and unmatched empirical success of the theory forces
us to give up at least some cherished philosophical assumption. Which one is
convenient to give up is the open question.
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The relational interpretation offers an alternative to the quantum state real-
ism of Many-Words-like interpretation and to the strong instrumentalism of the
strictly epistemic interpretations [39, 45, 40, 47, 69, 33]. It avoids introducing
“many worlds”, hidden variables, physical collapse, and also avoids the instru-
mentalism of other epistemic interpretations. But, like any other consistent
interpretations of quantum theory, it comes at a price.
It is compatible with diverse philosophical perspectives (see below). But not
all. Its main cost is a challenge to a strong version of realism, which is implied
by its radical relational stance.
Relationality is no surprise in physics. In classical mechanics the velocity of
an object has no meaning by itself: it is only defined with respect to another ob-
ject. The color of a quark in strong-interaction theory has no meaning by itself:
only the relative color of two quarks has meaning. In electromagnetism, the
potential at a point has no meaning, unless another point is taken as reference;
that is, only relative potentials have meanings. In general relativity, the loca-
tion of something is only defined with respect to the gravitational field, or with
respect to other physical entities; and so on. But quantum theory takes this
ubiquitous relationalism, to a new level: the actual value of all physical quan-
tities of any system is only meaningful in relation to another system. Value
actualisation is a relational notion like velocity.
Hence the conceptual cost of RQM is giving up a strong form of realism: not
only to give up the assumption that physical variables take values at all times,
but also to accept that they take values at different times for different systems.
Strong realism is ingrained in our common-sense view of the world, and is
often given for granted. For instance it is among the hidden hypotheses of the
Pusey-Barrett-Rudolph theorem [70]. The relational interpretation circumvents
theorems like these because these assume that at every moment of time all
properties are well defined. (For a review, see [71].) This assumption is ex-
plicitly denied in relational QM: properties do not exist at all times: they are
properties of events and the events happen at interactions. On the same vein,
in [63] Laudisa criticises relational QM because it does not provide a “deeper
justification” for the “state reduction process”. It is a stance based on a very
strong realist (in the narrow sense specified above) philosophical assumption.
A second element in RQM that challenges strong realism is that values taken
with respect to different systems can be compared [12] (hence there no solip-
sism), but the comparison amounts to a physical interaction, and its sharpness
is limited by ~. Therefore we cannot escape from the limitation to partial views:
there is no coherent global view available. Matthew Brown has discussed this
point in [24].
The third element in RQM that challenges strong realism, emphasized by
Dorato [25], is the ‘anti-monistic’ stance implicit in relational QM. Since the
state of a system is a bookkeeping device of interactions with something else, it
follows immediately that there is no meaning in “the quantum state of the full
universe”. There is no something else to the universe. Everett’s relative states
are the only quantum states we can meaningfully talk about. Every quantum
state is an Everett’s quantum state. (This does not prevent conventional quan-
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tum cosmology to be studied, since physical cosmology is not the science of
everything: it is the science of the largest-scale degrees of freedom [72].)
In the philosophical literature RQM as been extensively discussed by Bas van
Fraassen [19] from a marked empiricist perspective, by Michel Bitbol [20, 21]
who has given a neo-Kantian version of the interpretation, by Mauro Dorato
[22] who has defended it against a number of potential objections and discussed
its philosophical implication on monism and dispositionalism, and recently by
Laura Candiotto [23] who has given it an intriguing reading in terms of (Ontic)
Structural Realism [73]. Metaphysical and epistemological implications of rela-
tional QM have also been discussed by Matthew Brown [24] and Daniel Wolf
(né Wood) [34].
RQM has aspects in common with QBism [74], with Healey’s pragmatist
approach [75, 76] and is close in spirit with the view of quantum theory discussed
by Zeilinger and Bruckner [39, 40]. There are strong similarities with recent
ideas by Auffèves and Grangier [52, 53].
Perspective
Relational QM is a radical attempt to cash out the breakthrough that originated
the theory: the world is described by facts described by values of variables
that obey the equations of classical mechanics, but products of these variable
have a tiny non-commutativity that generically prevents sharp value assignment,
leading to discreteness, probability and to the contextual, relational character
of value assignment.
The founders expressed this contextual character on Nature in the “observer-
measurement” language. This language requires that special systems (the ob-
server, the classical world, macroscopic objects...) escape the quantum limi-
tations. But nothing of that sort (and in particular no “subjective states of
conscious observers”) is needed in the interpretation of QM. We can relinquish
this exception, and realise that any physical system can play the role of a
Copenhagen’s “observer”. Relational QM is Copenhagen quantum mechanics
made democratic by bringing all systems onto the same footing. Macroscopic
observers, that loose information to decoherence, can forget the labelling of
facts.
In the history of physics progress has often happened by realising that some
naively realist expectations were ill founded, and therefore by dropping this
kind of questions: How are the spheres governing the orbits of planet arranged?
What is the mechanical underpinning of the electric and magnetic fields? Into
where is the universe expanding? To some extent, one can say that modern
science itself was born in Newton’s celebrated “hypotheses non fingo”, which is
precisely the recognition that questions of this sort might be misleading.
When everybody else was trying to find dynamical laws accounting for
atoms, Heisenberg’s breakthrough was to realise that the known laws where
already good enough, but the question of the actual continuous orbit of the
electron was ill posed: the world is better comprehensible in terms of a sparse
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relational ontology. RQM is the realisation that this is what we have learned
about the world with quantum physics.
***
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